|
|
|
History of United States Naval Operations: Korea by James A. Field, Jr. Excerpt from Chapter 11, Part 6 The advent of new high-performance aircraft and the proliferation of nuclear weapons inevitably revolutionized the air defense problem. To increase the range of radar detection, early warning aircraft and radar picket submarines were given high priority. In fighter planes the machine gun gave way to the target-seeking missile, while aboard ship the antiaircraft gun began to disappear. Although the first group of post-Korean destroyers – one of which was to be christened Turner Joy – mounted new 3-inch automatic antiaircraft batteries, this was but a brief transitional phase. In 1955–56 the heavy cruisers Boston and Canberra were modified to carry two twin launching mounts for Terrier, a beam-riding antiaircraft missile with a ten-mile range. The next step was the conversion of the destroyer Gyatt to carry a Terrier mount, and of six Cleveland-class light cruisers, three to carry Terrier and three Talos, a larger missile with a slant range of up to 65 miles. And in due course there followed a program for guided missile destroyers of new design. United States Naval Operations Vietnam, Highlights February 1966 Highlights and Introduction In early February there was preoccupation at home with the Honolulu Conference, the continuing United States peace effort, and the debates before the Foreign Relations Committee on the war in Vietnam. In Vietnam, however, more than 200,000 Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Coast Guard men were preoccupied with the war. Task Force 77 lost nine planes and six pilots or crew in the first ten days after the bombing of North Vietnam had been resumed. U. S. MARKET TIME forces made approximately 2,000 day and night boardings during the same period, and Amphibious forces, led by attack transport Paul Revere (AP-248) supported Marines in Operation DOUBLE EAGLE. Off shore the Navy had nearly 70,000 men in nearly 150 ships. On shore were more than 10,000 serving as advisors on staffs, or performing tasks in other areas of support.
Peace, however, was being humbugged by Hanoi, who responded to American presentation of the issue before the United Nations Security Council by declaring that any resolution by that body would be considered null and void. Nevertheless, the American official position transcribed over and over in world mass communication media remained as follows: 1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. 2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof. 3. We would welcome "negotiations without pre-conditions" as the 17 nations put it. 4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it. 5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions. 6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose. 7. We want no U. S. bases in Southeast Asia. 8. We do not desire to retain U. S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured. 9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice. 10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision. 11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option. 12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars. 13. The President has said "The Viet Gong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem. 14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped. Navy men seemed to understand these principles better than some of their peers back home. As one Air Wing Commander put it, "Our men seemed to know why we were fighting out there which is the principal reason why our morale was so high." Another officer said that he was sure that the closer a ship was to Vietnam the higher was the morale of the crew. Naval Gunfire Support Navy gunners fired 19,556 rounds in February in support of missions that ranged from small besieged fronts to the amphibious operation DOUBLE EAGLE and the U. S. Army's search and destroy mission, MASHER. Oklahoma City (CLG-5) with COMSEVENTH Fleet embarked and Barry (DD-933) started the month by firing 100 rounds in support of DOUBLE EAGLE, and when Oklahoma City departed for Yokosuka, she was replaced by Topeka (CLG-8). Destroyers accepted targets that included cave hideouts, road blocks, camp structures, choke points, machine-gun emplacements, and sampans. Two destroyers, Orleck (DD-886) and Higbee (DD-806) set new records for time on the line. Higbee had a total of 34 consecutive days until she was relieved on 27 February, and Orleck 28. The latter demonstrated her skill with white phosphorous rounds on the 12th, damaging 95 structures and leaving others burning in a VC assembly area. Altogether, 14 destroyers plus Oklahoma City and Topeka carried out gunfire missions during the month in all four Corps areas. MARKET TIME ships, Vance and Finch, also were able to depart from their customary role of patrol and respond to a call for gunfire support. Canberra (CAG-2) chopped to Seventh Fleet on 19 February after CINCPAC Fleet's direction that a cruiser with eight inch guns be maintained in WESTPAC at all times. By the end of the month she was at work in Vietnam waters. As mentioned earlier, shore bombardment of North Vietnam occurred for the first time in February. This happened, however, only when Waddell and Brinkley Bass returned fire which they had first received from the shore. CINCPACFLT estimated the expenditure of 5"/38, 5"/54, 6"/47, and 8"/55 ammunition would exceed 30,000 rounds a month for the next six months.
Chapter 3: The Years of Combat, 1965-1968 The enemy's Tet Offensive in the first half of 1968 engaged the Naval Gunfire Support Unit in its heaviest combat actions of the war. Drawing on resources from all areas and commands, but especially from Operation Sea Dragon, Commander Task Unit 70.8.9 concentrated as many as 22 ships at one time on the gun line. These ships maintained high rates of fire during this crisis period, with the heavy cruisers firing an average of eight hundred rounds each day. In February, guided missile heavy cruiser Canberra (CAG 2), guided missile light cruiser Providence, and seven other surface ships poured fire into enemy targets in Hue, including the fortified Citadel. This naval support was critical to the allied recapture of the old Imperial City. The following month, Newport News (CA 148) reduced the flow of ammunition to desperately fighting enemy units when it destroyed an NVA logistic complex north of the Cua Viet River. In another instance, in May Henry B. Wilson (DDG 7) decimated a North Vietnamese battalion, killing 82 of the unit's troops. In similar actions during the first eight months of 1968, naval bombardments inflicted over two thousand casualties on the reeling Communist forces. Thus, during more than three years of deployment offshore, the Naval Gunfire Support Unit had become a valuable component of the allied forces defending South Vietnam.
Revised: Sunday, May 12, 2002 |
|
|
